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11 U.S.C. Section 521(2)(A): Fresh Start
or Head Start?
Section 521 of title 11, United States Code, requires the
individual bankrupt debtor to file a schedule of assets and liabilities
detailing the debtor's property and debts existing at the time the
debtor filed for bankruptcy.1 Those assets and liabilities make up
the bankruptcy estate which is automatically created upon filing the
bankruptcy petition.2 If any of the listed liabilities is a consumer
debt secured3 by any of the listed property of the estate, section
521(2)(A) requires the debtor to file a statement of intent as to
whether he or she will keep or surrender such property.4
If applicable, section 521(2)(A) further requires the debtor to
indicate whether such property is exempt, whether the debtor
intends to redeem that property, or whether the debtor intends to
reaffirm the debt secured by that property.5 Redemption is satisfied
by payment of the fair market value of the property up to the
1. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
2. Bankruptcy Code section 541 provides that all of the debtor's property, wherever located
and by whomever held, whether legal or equitable, becomes property of the estate unless provided
otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
3. Secured property is property that has been pledged to assure payment of an obligation.
Such property is intended to be used to satisfy that obligation should the debtor fail to make payment.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1354 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Section 521(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which
are secured by property of the estate-
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this
title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the
debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the
retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying ihat such
property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or
that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property.
Id § 521(2)(A) (1988).
5. Id. Bankruptcy Code section 522 provides that the debtor may exempt certain property
from estate property. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988). Once declared as exempt, the property may not be
seized to satisfy the debtor's liabilities in a manner that impairs the debtor's exemption. Id.
1239
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
amount of the debt.6 Reaffirmation requires the negotiation of a
new agreement with the creditor under which the debtor assumes
personal liability of the debt secured by the property.7
It is the requirement which directs the debtor to indicate his or
her intent to redeem the property or reaffirm the accompanying
debt which has given rise to a split of authority among the circuit
courts. The ambiguous language "if applicable," 8 makes it unclear
whether this requirement is applicable only if the debtor chooses
one of the stated alternatives or if the debtor must choose one of
the stated alternatives with the one thus chosen becoming
"applicable." Some courts have interpreted the debtor's choices to
be limited to redemption or reaffirmation, if the debtor intends to
retain estate property that serves as security to one of the debtor's
consumer debts.' This means the debtor who intends to keep such
property must either redeem the property by paying the fair market
value or enter an agreement with the creditor to reaffirm his or her
personal liability for the accompanying debt.1" Conversely, other
courts have held that redemption and reaffirmation are not the
debtor's only alternatives." These courts maintain that redemption
or reaffirmation is applicable only if the debtor actually chooses to
do one or the other. 12 Jurisdictions adhering to this approach
permit the debtor to continue making installment payments as
provided under the original consumer debt agreement, thus giving
debtors a third choice not explicitly provided in section 521.13
6. Section 722 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that: **An individual debtor may, whether
or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property
intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable
consumer debt... ." Id. § 722 (1988).
7. Bankruptcy Code section 524(c) provides that a reaffirmation is an agreement between the
debtor and a claim holder. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988). The consideration for this agreement is a
dischargeable debt. Id. The agreement must be entered in good faith and requires the court's
approval. Id.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). See supra note 4.
9. See infra notes 46-105 and accompanying text (cases illustrating all-inclusive
interpretation).
10. Id
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Part I of this Comment will set forth the legislative history in
order to determine and analyze the legislative intent of section
521."4 The contradictory interpretations of section 521 will then
be discussed in Part II through recent case history. 15 Based on the
foregoing analysis, Part IH will explore the effects of making the
statement of intent to redeem or reaffirm mandatory and the effects
of making the choices discretionary. 16 This Comment will then
conclude that the proper interpretation is that the options of
redemption and reaffirmation are the only options available to the
individual bankrupt debtor who opts to retain estate property which
serves as the security for a consumer debt.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 521
Prior to the 1984 bankruptcy amendments, the debtor was
required to file a schedule of assets and liabilities detailing his
property and debts at the time of filing a bankruptcy petition.17
There was no corresponding duty upon the debtor to disclose his
or her intended disposition of any listed property which secured the
repayment of any of the listed liabilities."'
When possession of the secured property was maintained by the
debtor, the creditor was placed at a disadvantage due to the
automatic stay, which becomes effective immediately upon the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 9 The automatic stay prohibits
any contact, prior to discharge, between the creditor and the
debtor.2" Thus, from the time the bankruptcy petition was filed
until the debtor received a discharge, the creditor was usually left
14. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 43-143 and accompanying text.
16. See infTa notes 144-157 and accompanying text.
17. S. REP. No. 446,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 at 6. (1982). The 1984 Bankruptcy amendments
provided for the renumbering of the original paragraphs of section 521 as (1), (3), (4) and (5) and
the addition of a new subsection (2). 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
18. S. REP. No. 446. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 at 17 (1982).
19. Id See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (automatic stay provision).
20. Id § 362 (1988). The creditor may not commence any proceedings against the debtor
which may have been commenced prior to the time the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Id
1241
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
in the dark, unsure of what was to happen to his or her collateral.
Would it be returned to the creditor? Would it be lost or destroyed?
Following the debtor's discharge, the secured creditor's lien on
the secured property remained in place.21 However, in the absence
of a redemption or reaffirmation by the debtor, the creditor's ability
to protect his or her interest in that property was limited and
unappealing. For instance, the creditor could seek judicial relief
from the automatic stay in order to enforce the lien.22 However,
this process could take several weeks or even months, and could
actually cost more than the value of the secured property itself.23
Meanwhile, the property would remain in the debtor's possession
subject to the risks of loss, theft or destruction.24 Additionally, the
property would continue to depreciate.'
Another means purportedly available to protect the creditor's
interest in secured property was the affirmative duty imposed upon
the bankruptcy trustee to obtain and deliver the secured property to
the creditor.26 In practice, however, the trustee did not generally
comply with this duty.27 The costs incurred in the retrieval of
such property from the debtor were assessed against the already
limited estate assets.28 This had a detrimental effect on unsecured
creditors whose pro rata distribution from the remaining estate
assets were proportionately reduced by the amount of such
expenditures. Furthermore, the trustee was not likely to be fully
compensated for his or her efforts to retrieve such property.29
Thus the retrieval was solely for the benefit of the secured
creditor.3" The trustee, therefore, generally refused to use estate
assets in this manner.3"
21. S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 at 17 (1982).




26. Id. The trustee is the estate representative and as such may sue and be sued. II U.S.C.
§ 323 (1988).
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Consumer bankruptcy cases were on the rise. In the wake of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code amendments, the number of consumer
bankruptcy cases had more than doubled, increasing from 196,976
cases in 1978 to 452,145 cases in 1981.32 The estimated
bankruptcy losses for 1981 exceeded $6 billion.33 The short term
effect of this dramatic increase resulted in a shift of credit costs
from the debtor to the creditor.3 Creditors, unable to recover from
the debtor's bankruptcy estate, were forced to incur estimated
bankruptcy losses during 1981 in excess of $6 billion.
35 Creditors'
reactions to this were varied. Some creditors implemented stricter
standards for extending credit, such as higher income requirements
for the potential borrower, effectively denying credit to less affluent
debtors.36 Other creditors raised their lending interest rates,
shifting the burden of increased credit costs to the nonbankrupt
debtor who was able to meet his or her obligations.37 Thus, the
long term costs of rising bankruptcy losses are borne by the
bankrupt and nonbankrupt debtors alike, assuming the debtor is
able to obtain credit at all.
38
In response to the spiraling costs associated with consumer
bankruptcy cases, the debtor's duties were revised by Congress.
Revisions to the debtor's duties were originally proposed by a
coalition of bankers, credit unions, finance companies, oil
companies and retailers.39 Members of that coalition appeared
before the Subcommittee on the Courts of the Committee on the
Judiciary to present a proposal aimed at eliminating the perceived
defects of the 1978 code.' This proposal was designed to ensure
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id at 6 n.3.
34. Id at 6.
35. Id at 6 n.3.
36. Id. at 6; PROPOSED CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1981: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 at
2-4 (1981) (statement of Senator Robert J. Dole, Chairman).
37. S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 at 6 (1982).
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id. at 7. PROPOSED CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1981: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 at
1-4 (1981) (statement of Senator Robert . Dole, Chairman).
1243
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equity between debtors and creditors, particularly with regard to
secured consumer debts.41
The ultimate result of those hearings was the 1984 bankruptcy
amendments, which included revisions to the debtor's duties under
section 521.42 The new subsection 2 of section 521 requires the
individual bankrupt debtor to file a statement as to whether he or
she intends to keep or surrender any property of the bankrupt estate
which serves as collateral to a consumer debt.43 This statement is
to be filed with the clerk within thirty days after filing a petition
under chapter 7 of title 11. 4' If applicable, the statement must also
indicate whether the debtor will redeem property from the
accompanying debt or enter an agreement with the creditor to
reaffirn the associated debt.45
II. THE CONTRADICTORY INTERPRETATIONS
OF SECTION 521
Section 521(2)(A) requires the individual bankrupt debtor to file
a statement indicating whether the debtor intends to keep or
surrender property which serves as collateral for one of the debtor's
liabilities.46 If the debtor intends to retain the property, the debtor
must then, if applicable, file a statement indicating whether he or
she will pay the accompanying debt or whether he or she will enter
into an agreement with the creditor to reaffirm that debt.47 It is
this latter requirement that has given rise to the conflicting
interpretations of section 521.48
41. PROPOSED CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENT AcT OF 1981: HEARINGs BEFORETHE
SUBCOMM. ON COURTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 at 63 (1981)
(statement of Professor Jonathan M. Landers, University of Illinois, Claude Rice, attorney and Alvin
0. Wiese, Jr., attorney, setting forth general concerns with the then-current Bankruptcy Code).
42. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,98 Stat.
352 (1984) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1988)).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1988).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing debtor's duties).
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 46-143 and accompanying text (discussing opposing interpretations).
1244
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A. The All-Inclusive Interpretation
Jurisdictions adhering to the all-inclusive interpretation maintain
that the debtor who chooses to retain estate property that secures
a loan has only two options: he or she must either redeem the
property or reaffirm the underlying debt.49 The courts support this
conclusion with a variety of reasons which include the plain
meaning of the statute, the distinction between a chapter 7 and a
chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, as well as the ramifications of
deciding otherwise.5"
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell,51 a case decided
before the 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments, the debtor sought
to redeem estate property by making monthly installment
payments.52 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the sole permissible
means of redemption was a lump sum payment to the creditor.53
A debtor unable to make the lump sum redemption could continue
to make installment payments only after executing a court-approved
consensual reaffirmation agreement.54
Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 521 did not impose an
express duty upon the debtor to choose between redemption or
reaffirmation. The mechanics of these options were, however, set
forth in sections 722 and 524(c), respectively.55 The Bell court
reasoned that the redemption option, found in section 722, was
49. See infra notes 46-105 and accompanying text (cases illustrating all-inclusive
interpretation).
50. See infra notes 48-105 and accompanying text (setting forth cases in support of the all-
inclusive interpretation). A chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding provides the debtor with relief from
burdensome debts through liquidation of the debtor's assets. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766
(1988) (setting forth chapter 7 bankruptcy provisions). A chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding provides
the debtor relief from burdensome debts through a rehabilitation plan. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§
1301-1330 (1988) (setting forth chapter 13 bankruptcy provisions).
51. 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983).
52. Id at 1054.
53. Id at 1058. The lump sum was the fair market value of the collateral or the balance of
the creditor's interest in the collateral, whichever was less. Id at 1055. See also In re Zimmerman,
4 Bankr. 739 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Hart, 8 Bankr. 1020 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1981) (cases
supporting lump sum definition of redemption).
54. Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056.
55. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 722 (1988). See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing
sections 722 and 524(c) respectively).
1245
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intended to encompass the lump sum requirement provided under
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-506, upon which section 722
was based.56
Moreover, the court examined section 722 in light of the
reaffirmation option found in section 524(c).57 A section 524(c)
reaffirmation agreement is one negotiated between the debtor and
the creditor which creates anew the debtor's personal liability for
the property at issue.5" The debtor, with the court's approval, is
able to make installment payments under such an agreement.59
Redemption by installments would render the reaffirmation
provision superfluous since debtors could retain secured estate
property without the requisite personal liability of a reaffirmation
agreement.60
The Bell court recognized that an insolvent debtor may be
financially incapable of redeeming his or her property by making
the requisite lump sum payment. However, the court maintained
that the debtor's inability to exercise the option of redemption was
not sufficient grounds to ignore the plain meaning of the statute.
61
Thus, in order to retain collateralized estate property, the debtor
could either make a lump sum redemption or make installment
payments pursuant to a consensual reaffirmation agreement.6' An
installment redemption was not possible when section 722 and
section 524(c) were read together.63
Following the 1984 amendments, courts have continued to
sustain the conclusion that installment payments are only permitted
56. Bell, 700 F.2d at 1055. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1990) (debtor's right to redeem collateral);
In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860, 862 n.4 (contrasting 11 U.S.C. section 722 redemption and U.C.C.
section 9-506 redemption).
57. Bell, 700 F.2d at 1055. See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988); Id. § 524(c) (1988) (redemption and
reaffirmation provisions). See also supra notes 6-7 (text of reaffirmation and redemption provisions).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988). See supra note 7 and accompanying text (reaffirnation
provision).
59. Bell, 700 F.2d at 1055.
60. Id. at 1056.
61. Id. at 1057.
62. Id. at 1058.
63. Id. at 1055-56.
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under a consensual reaffrmnation agreement," The Seventh
Circuit, in In re Edwards,65 held that when an individual bankrupt
debtor chooses to retain property which secures a consumer debt,
his or her only options are to either redeem the property from the
accompanying debt or expressly reaffirm the underlying debt.'
The court further held that redemption is satisfied only by a lump
sum payment of the debt or the property's fair market value,
whichever is less, and not by continued installment payments. 67
In that case, Edwards filed a statement indicating her intent to
reaffin the debt.6" However, she never executed the
corresponding reaffirmation agreement.69  Instead, Edwards
continued to make the regularly scheduled payments in accordance
with the original debt agreement.7" Nonetheless, the creditor who
held the promissory notes for the property in question sought to
have Edwards compelled to perform in accordance with her
original statement of intent to reaffirm.71
In reaching its decision, the Edwards court relied on several
factors. The court looked to the plain meaning of section 521,
which states "[t]he debtor shall file . . . a statement of his
intention."72 The court interpreted the word "shall" as imposing
a mandatory duty upon the debtor to choose between the provided
options of redemption and reaffirmation, rather than giving the
debtor the ability to do neither.73 The choice of doing neither
would have been a plausible inference had the statute instead read
"the debtor may file a statement of his intention."
64. See infra notes 62-76 (discussing Edwards); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the debtor's options are limited to reaffirmation and redemption, and redemption is
fulfilled by lump sum payment only).
65. 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
66. Id at 1387.
67. Il at 1385 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 (6th
Cir. 1983)).
68. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1384.
69. Id See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2) (providing that the debtor may rescind a reaffirmation
agreement at any time prior to discharge or within 60 days after filing such agreement with the court,
whichever is later).
70. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1384.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1386 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 521) (emphasis added).
73. Id
1247
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The court next pointed out the specific period of time for
performance indicated in section 521(2)(13).74 That subsection
provides that the debtor must perform his or her stated intention
under section 521(2)(A) to redeem or reaffirm within forty-five
days after filing such notice of intent or within additional time
granted by the court.75 Thus, the limited time for performance
eliminated the possibility of installment payments, which by their
nature spread over an extended period of time."6
Citing Bell, the Edwards court emphasized the intended
voluntariness of reaffirmation agreements."' When the debtor
continues to make installment payments without reaffirming his or
her personal liability and without the creditor's consent, the debtor
has in effect imposed a new arrangement on the creditor.78 This
arrangement is contrary to the intended voluntariness of section
524(c), which requires the creditor to consent to reaffirmation
agreements.79
Additionally, the court examined the legislative history of the
1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments and the societal ramifications
that would flow from not limiting the debtor's choices to
redemption and reaffirmation.8" The effect of bankruptcy is to
release the debtor from personal obligations by discharging his or
her debts.81 In the absence of a redemption or reaffirmation,
following such a discharge, the debtor is no longer personally liable
74. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)03) (1988). The 1984 amendments to the bankruptcy code
provide that:
[W]ithin forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or within
such additional times as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, the
debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
Id.
75. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 (citing I I U.S.C. § 521). See I I U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) and supra
note 71 (setting forth time limits for performance of debtor's stated intent).
76. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386.
77. Id. at 1385 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th
Cir. 1983)).
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on loans that are secured by property of the bankrupt estate. 2
Where the debtor retains possession of such property, the creditor's
only means of recourse in the event of the debtor's subsequent
default is to seek repossession. 3 In the meantime, the secured
property at issue remains in the possession of the debtor, who, due
to the discharge, is no longer legally obligated to maintain or insure
the property." If the value of the property drops below the
balance of the loan, the creditor becomes undersecured and bears
the risk of additional exposure. 5 The creditor in turn increases the
cost of future credit to society in general to ensure adequate
protection from such risks.86 The court concluded that the
legislative intent of the amendments was to provide increased
creditor protection from those risks, while stabilizing the rising
costs of credit by requiring the debtor to either redeem secured
property by a lump sum payment or reaffirm his or her personal
liability.
8 7
The Edwards court concluded that the debtor who chooses to
retain estate property that secures a consumer loan must then
choose to either redeem the property or reaffirm the underlying
debt.88 Although the court held that there were no other options
available to the debtor in such a situation, the court did not compel
the debtor to choose reaffirmation over redemption, as requested by
the creditor.8 9 The court justified this rationale by pointing to the





86. Id See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 at 6 (1982)(discussing creditor's
reactions to rising bankruptcy costs). See also PROPOSED BANKRUFrY IMPROVEMENTAcTOF 1981:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SuBcoMM. ON COURTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 11 (1981) (statement of Mr. Andrew F. Brimmer, president, Brimmer & Co., Inc., Washington,
D.C., economic and financial consultants, discussing costs of spiraling bankruptcy cases).
87. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386.
88. d
89. Id Although the court viewed the options as mandatory, the court would not place further
restrictions upon the debtor which could impair the debtor's ability to obtain a fresh start. Id. at 1384.
1249
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improvident reaffination agreements.9' The choice between
redemption and reaffirmation is the debtor's alone.91
In re Chavarria,' a case quite similar to Edwards, supports
the conclusion that the debtor who wants to keep estate property
that secures an installment loan must choose between the exclusive
options of redemption and reaffirmation.93 The Chavarria court
then addressed the court's power to enforce the debtor's adherence
to the debtor's stated choice. The court described the Bankruptcy
Code as an attempt to equalize the naturally opposing interests of
debtors and creditors.94 A discharge in bankruptcy relieves the
debtor from personal liability on loans secured by estate
property.95 When the debtor retains such property without
redeeming or reaffirming, the creditor is burdened with all the risks
of the debtor's continued possession." Installment payments, in
the absence of a reaffirmation agreement, permit the debtor to
benefit from retention without assuming the risks of personal
liability.' The court would not create such an alternative that
shifted the balance in the debtor's favor.98 The court reasoned that
if a chapter 7 debtor seeking relief through the liquidation of his or
her liabilities wished to make installment payments, then the
debtor's proper remedy was a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding,
which provides relief through reorganization of the debtor's
liabilities.9"
As in Edwards, the Chavarria court then looked to the statutory
language. Section 521(2)(A) provides the debtor with a minimum
of thirty days after filing a bankruptcy petition to state his or her
intent to either redeem or reaffirm." 0 Once the debtor states his
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1385.
92. 117 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990)
93. Id. at 583.
94. Id. at 584.
95. Id (quoting In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990)).
96. Chavarria, 117 Bankr. at 584.
97. Id
98. Id at 584-85.
99. Id at 585.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1988); see also supra note 4 (text of section 521(2)(A)).
1250
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or her intent, section 521(2)(B) provides the debtor a minimum of
forty-five days thereafter in which to perform his or her stated
intent. 1 ' In addition, the Code specifically permits an extension
of those time limits in certain circumstances, upon request."° The
court concluded that the minimum time constraint of seventy five
days provides the debtor ample time to determine which option
best suits him or her and to perform accordingly. 10 3 The court
reasoned that these time restraints gave the debtor sufficient
protection from the danger of making improvident financial
decisions." 4
Despite the lack of any express language of enforcement, the
Chavarria court concluded that it had the power to order the debtor
to choose between redemption and reaffirmation and to perform
accordingly. 0 5 This interpretation is consistent with the Code's
purpose of balancing the competing interests of the debtor and
creditor, while providing the debtor ample time in which to
perform."t 6 The debtor also has the option of converting to a
chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.'0 7 The court reasoned that any
other interpretation would render section 521 ineffectual.'0 8
In summary, the all-inclusive interpretation is based on the
plain meaning of section 521 and the legislative history and
purpose of that section. The plain meaning creates a mandatory
choice between redemption and reaffirmation for the debtor who
desires to retain collateralized estate property. The plain meaning
also makes redemption by installments impossible due to the forty-
five day limit on performance found in section 521(2)(B). This
interpretation furthers the legislative intent of the 1984 amendments
to equalize the contrasting interests of debtors and creditors. The
101. Chavarria, 117 Bankr. at 585. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (1988); see also supra note 71
(text of section 521(2)(B)).
102. Chavarria, 117 Bankr. at 585. See l U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) - (B) (1988); supra notes 4 and
71 (text of section 521(2)).
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all-inclusive interpretation complies with the intended voluntariness
of reaffirmation agreements by prohibiting installment payments
without the creditor's prior consent. In the absence of the creditor's
consent, the debtor can continue making installment payments only
under a chapter 13 bankruptcy. Otherwise, a debtor can procure a
redemption only by a lump sum payment.
B. The Noninclusive Interpretation
Jurisdictions adhering to the noninclusive interpretation
maintain that the bankrupt debtor seeking to retain collateralized
estate property is not limited to the options of redemption and
reaffirmation.'09 In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West1 ' the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the debtor is only required
to file a statement of intent as to whether he or she will keep or
surrender the collateralized property."' A further statement
indicating an intent to redeem the property or to reaffirm the loan
is only required if the debtor actually chooses one of those
options." Thus, in a Lowry jurisdiction, the debtor who chooses
to retain estate property that secures an installment loan has three
options."' The debtor can redeem the property, reaffirm the debt
or continue to make the regularly scheduled installment
payments.
11 4
In Lowry, the debtors filed a statement of intent indicating their
plan to retain the truck that served as collateral for an installment
loan." 5 The debtors made no indication as to whether they would
redeem the property or reaffirm the associated debt."16 However,
the debtors did remain current on the regularly scheduled payments
under the original installment agreement." 7 The court held that
109. See infra notes 107-143 and accompanying text (discussing noninclusive interpretation).
110. 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989)
111. 1 4 at 1544-45.
112. Id at 1546.
113. Id
114. Id
115. Id at 1544-45.
116. Id
117. Id at 1545.
1252
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the debtors' choice of retaining the property while continuing to
make installment payments was valid."' 8
In its analysis, the court looked .to the language of the debtor's
duties set forth in section 521.119 Although the court found the
choice between redemption and reaffirmation obviously mandatory
under the plain meaning of section 521, the court noted that there
was nothing in the Code to indicate that these were the debtor's
exclusive choices. 120 Furthermore, the court took notice of the
lack of any means of enforcement should the debtor fail to fully
comply with the requirements of section 521(2).121 While the
bankruptcy trustee is vested with the responsibility to ensure the
debtor's compliance, the trustee has no corresponding power of
enforcement.12 Additionally, section 521(2) does not provide any
debtor penalties or creditor remedies in the event of the debtor's
noncompliance."1 The court concluded that since Congress did
not provide any penalties for the debtor's noncompliance, nor any
means to enforce section 521(2), there was no congressional intent
to limit the debtor to redemption or reaffirmation. 124 Therefore,
even in the face of the debtor's noncompliance with the clearly
mandatory language of section 521(2), the creditor was not entitled
to seek repossession of the property at issue."z So long as there
was no evidence to indicate that either party would be prejudiced,
the court concluded that it was within the discretion of the
bankruptcy court to permit retention so long as the debtor
continued to perform in accordance with the original security
agreement. 26 Thus, the debtor was not limited exclusively to the
options of redemption and reaffirmation.127
118. Id at 1546.
119. Id at 1545-47. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (discussing Lowry).
120. Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1545-47.
121. Id at 1545.
122. Id See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1988) (role and capacity of trustee provision); see also supra
note 25 (defining trustee's capacity).
123. Id. at 1545. See infra notes 4 and 71 (text of section 521(2)).
124. Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546.
125. Id
126. Id at 1547.
127. Id at 1546.
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In In re Belanger," a similar case, the debtors expressed
their intent to retain their mobile home while continuing to make
monthly payments in accordance with the original debt
agreement.t29 In reaching its decision, the court again looked to
the statutory language and the legislative history of the 1984
amendments to section 521.3
In examining the statutory language, the court focused on the
term "if applicable," which precedes the choices of redemption
and reaff'ation.3 The court interpreted this to mean that
redemption and reaffirmation were applicable only if the debtor
chose to do one or the other.1 32 Thus, the debtor who opts to
continue making installment payments is not required to state his
or her intent to redeem or reaffirm because these options do not
become applicable if the debtor does not chose one of them.133
The court's examination of the legislative history focused on
the motive behind the 1984 amendment to section 521.134 Secured
creditors wanted to know the debtor's intended disposition of their
secured property."' However, the automatic stay prohibited any
contact between the creditor and the debtor after the bankruptcy
petition had been filed. 3 6 The creditor would often engage in
costly and time-consuming court proceedings in an effort to
determine the debtor's intent, only to discover that the debtor
intended to surrender the property all along. 37 Thus, the
128. 118 Bankr. 368 (Bankr. N.C. 1990).
129. Id. at 369.
130. See infra notes 128-142 and accompanying text (discussing In re Belanger).
131. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 369-70. Bankruptcy Code section 521(2)(A) provides that if the
debtor chooses to retain collateralized estate property, the debtor must, if applicable, indicate that the
property is exempt, that he or she intends to redeem the property, or that he or she intends to reaffirm
the underlying debt. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). See supra note 4 (text of section 521(2)(A)).
132. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 369-70.
133. 1&
134. Id. See infra notes 132-139 and accompanying text (discussing court's interpretation of
legislative history).
135. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 370 (quoting H. Sommer, The 1984 Changes in Consumer
Bankruptcy Law, 31 PRAcrrcAL LAw,'ER 45, 55 (1985)).
136. Id at 370-71. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (automatic stay provision); see also supra note
19 (discussing the automatic stay provision).
137. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 371. See S. REP. No. 446,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (discussing
creditors' concerns).
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creditors' proponents advocated placing an affirmative duty upon
the debtor to disclose his intended disposition by filing a statement
of intent.
138
The court viewed the statement of intent as a mere notice
requirement. 39 The required early disclosure of intent regarding
retention or surrender would reduce expenses and improve judicial
efficiency by permitting the creditor to identify potentially disputed
matters at an early stage. 4" The court believed that a debtor
would not likely fail to make payments or maintain the property
simply because the debt had been discharged, since such action
would enable the creditor to repossess the property. 4' Thus,
further creditor protection was not needed. Furthermore, the court
held that an interpretation of section 521 which restricted the
debtor to the exclusive options of redemption and reaffirmation
would impair the debtor's rightful fresh start. 42
The court concluded that the plain meaning of the statutory
language and the legislative history of section 521 indicated that
the benefit to creditors was merely a right to early notice regarding
the debtor's intended disposition of secured property. 43
Accordingly, the court held that the debtor was only required to
disclose his or her intent to redeem or reaffirm if the debtor
actually so intended. 44 If the debtor intended to do neither, the
debtor had the additional option of remaining current on the
regularly scheduled installment payments. 145
In summary, the noninclusive approach is predicated upon the
language of the statute. This language does not explicitly require
138. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 371.
139. Id at 370.
140. Id at 371. SEE PROPOSED CONSUMER BANKRUPTcY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1981:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 at 63 (1981) (statement of Professor Jonathan M. Landers, University of Illinois, Claude
Rice, attorney, and Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., attorney) (discussing benefits of required early disclosure).
141. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 371.
142. Id at 370. A fresh start is "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
143. Belanger, 118 Bankr. at 370.
144. Id at 372.
145. Id
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a choice between redemption and reaffirmation as indicated by the
words "if applicable." 146 Nor does this language specifically
prohibit the debtor from making installment payments in lieu of a
redemption or reaffirmation. Moreover, the language does not
provide any enforcement provisions or sanctions for
noncompliance. Thus, the courts adhering to the noninclusive
approach have held that section 521 grants them the discretion to
permit the continuance of regularly scheduled installment payments.
Additional support is found in the legislative history which
indicates that creditors, seeking early disclosure of the debtor's
intended disposition of collateralized estate property, merely sought
to impose a notice requirement upon the debtor. Thus, the debtor
need only disclose his or her intent to redeem the property or
reaffirm the debt if the debtor actually intends to choose one of
those options. If not, the debtor has the third option to continue the
regularly scheduled installment payments.
Ill. THE ALL-INCLUSiVE AND NONINCLUSIVE
APPROACHES COMPARED
The underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide
the overburdened debtor a "fresh start" financially. 47 In a
chapter 7 proceeding, this is accomplished by liquidating the
debtor's assets in order to satisfy the debtor's creditors.148 To the
extent that the debtor's liabilities cannot be satisfied from those
assets, the debtor receives a discharge.149 Following the
discharge, the debtor is no longer personally liable on any debts
that remain unsatisfied.
Although the debtor's personal liability has been discharged,
pre-bankruptcy liens on the debtor's property remain in force to the
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988) ("if applicable" language).
147. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (defining "fresh start").
148. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (defining chapter 7 bankruptcy).
149. See 11 U.S.C. 727 (1988) (providing that the debtor shall be granted a discharge unless
certain specified conditions, beyond the scope of this Comment, exist).
1256
1991 / 11 U.S.C. Section 521(2)(A)
extent that such liens do not impair the debtor's exemptions.150
When the debtor chooses to retain estate property that secures a
loan, a conflict arises between the interests of the debtor in
obtaining a fresh start and those of the creditor in limiting his or
her potential exposure.15 1 Section 521(2) sets forth the debtor's
duties under such circumstances and adds to the confusion
regarding the competing interests of the debtor and creditor.'52
The options of surrender or redemption or reaffirmation arise
in two situations: when the trustee abandons estate property
because the fair market value of that property is less than the lien
that is attached to the property, and when the debtor claims certain
estate property or a portion thereof as exempt.'53 When the
debtor chooses to retain such property, the split between the
circuits demonstrates that it is not clear whether the debtor must
then either redeem the property or reaffirm the underlying debt in
order to retain the property. 5
A. The All-Inclusive Interpretation
The all-inclusive interpretation, which limits the debtor to the
alternatives of redemption and reaffirmation, best promotes the
spirit of the Bankruptcy Code. The all-inclusive interpretation
enables the debtor to achieve his or her desired fresh start, yet
prevents the debtor from obtaining a head start at the expense of
his or her secured creditors.
Interpreting the options of redemption and reaffirmation as all-
inclusive does not leave the debtor without options. Although
redemption may be satisfied only with a lump sum payment, the
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988) (avoidance ofjudicial liens or nonpossessory, nonpurchase-
money security interests in certain property provision).
151. See supra notes 43-143 and accompanying text (cases illustrating all-inclusive and
noninclusive approaches).
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988) (setting forth debtor's duties) and infra notes 43-143 and
accompanying text (illustrating the conflicting approaches).
153. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (exemption provision). See also 11 U.S.C. 722
(1988) (historical and revision notes discussing when the right of redemption is available to a
bankrupt debtor).
154. See supra notes 43-143 and accompanying text (illustrating conflict).
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debtor has the ability to make installment payments under a
consensual, court-approved reaffirmation agreement. Had Congress
intended to give the debtor the option of an installment redemption,
the reaffirmation provision would not have been necessary. To read
such an option into the section 722 redemption would render the
section 542(c) reaffirmation agreement useless.
Additionally, the all-inclusive interpretation protects the
creditor. In the absence of a redemption of the property or a
reaffirmation of the debt, the creditor's only means of recourse
would be repossession. Placing an affirmative requirement on the
debtor to reaffirm or redeem protects the creditor in the event of
the debtor's subsequent default or the destruction of the property.
Courts supporting the noninclusive interpretation believe that the
debtor would not be likely to default on payments since such action
would allow the creditor to seek repossession.'55 While the threat
of repossession may provide some incentive to remain current on
the attached obligation, repossession provides little protection to the
creditor. Should the property be lost, stolen, or destroyed, the
debtor, who is no longer obligated to make payments or to
maintain property insurance following his or her discharge, can
simply walk away. The creditor is left holding the bill for property
which the debtor possessed and enjoyed without interruption. The
all-inclusive interpretation protects the legitimate interests of the
creditor, while allowing the debtor to achieve a fresh start.
The all-inclusive approach does not prevent the debtor from
achieving the legitimate benefit of the removal of onerous debt.
The all-inclusive approach does, however, prevent the debtor from
receiving the dual benefits of discharge and unfettered possession
of the property that once secured a discharged debt, by requiring
the debtor to choose between redeeming the property in question
or reaffirming the associated debt.156
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155. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 722; supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (redemption and
reaffirmation provisions).
156. See supra notes 46-105 and accompanying text (discussing all-inclusive interpretation).
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B. The Noninclusive Interpretation
Courts adhering to the noninclusive interpretation have focused
on the placement of the words "if applicable" in section
521(2)(A), which precede the requirement that the debtor state
whether the property he or she intends to keep is exempt, whether
he or she intends to redeem that property or whether he or she
intends to reaffirm its underlying debt. 157 These courts have
interpreted this language to mean that the choices provided after
"if applicable" are optional, becoming applicable only if the
debtor actually chooses one of them. Accordingly, these courts
have held that section 521 grants them the discretion to fashion
other alternatives, such as continued installment payments.
While the placement of the phrase "if applicable" is somewhat
misleading, the noninclusive interpretation would render the section
524(c) reaffirmation agreement useless. Viewed in this light, it
becomes clear that the phrase "if applicable" applies only to the
requirement to indicate whether the property at issue is exempt.
Such an interpretation leaves the debtor with the duty to choose
between redemption and reaffirmation. Furthermore, the affirmative
language "[t]he debtor shall" contradicts the noninclusive
interpretation that the debtor's affirmative duty is made optional by
the words "if applicable." 8
The noninclusive courts find further support for their
interpretation in the legislative history of the 1984
amendments.159 Relying on the creditors' motivation in seeking
the changes, these courts label the debtor's duty to indicate his or
her intent to redeem or reaffirm as a mere notice requirement. If
this were true, however, it would then follow that creditors would
require similar notice of the debtor's intent to simply continue
making installment payments. It seems more likely that creditors
1259
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). See also supra notes 106-143 and accompanying text
(discussing noninclusive interpretation).
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
159. See supra notes 131-139 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history).
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were motivated by more than the mere early disclosure of the
debtor's intended disposition of secured property.
The noninclusive approach permits the debtor to make
installment payments without executing a reaffirmation agreement,
despite the creditor's objections. This enables the debtor to
maintain possession of property that is subject to the creditor's lien
with no personal liability. In effect, the debtor is permitted to form
a new, one-sided arrangement with the creditor, which negates the
intent that reaffirmation agreements be entered into voluntarily by
both debtors and creditors. l60
The long-term repercussions of such an approach, however, will
come to bear on the debtor. The creditor, faced with increased
costs and risks associated with consumer credit, will be forced to
pass such costs along to consumers in general. Such costs could
take the form of higher interest rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 521 details some of the bankrupt debtor's duties.
Included is a requirement to file a statement of intent disclosing the
debtor's intended disposition of collateralized estate property. The
Code provides further that, if applicable, the debtor must file a
statement indicating his or her intent to redeem that property or
reaffirm the associated debt.
This latter requirement is the subject of a split of authority
among the circuits.1 6 1 Some circuits hold that the debtor's
exclusive options are to redeem the property with a lump sum
payment or reaffirm the underlying debt. Others maintain that the
debtor has yet a third option to continue to make the regularly
scheduled installment payments.
The controversial language of section 521(2) was implemented
as part of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments, largely as an
attempt to balance the scales of equity between debtors and secured
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988); supra note 7 and accompanying text (defining
reaffirmation agreement).
161. See supra notes 43-143 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting approaches).
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creditors. To label the statute as a mere notice requirement and the
provided options as noninclusive is self-contradictory. The debtor
need only choose a course of action not provided by the statute in
order to alleviate the need to provide notice. Such an interpretation
would render section 521(2) superfluous and infer the unlikely
conclusion that Congress intended the phrase to have no meaning
at all. Thus, the proper approach is the all-inclusive interpretation.
The all-inclusive interpretation imposes a mandatory
requirement upon the debtor desirous of retaining collateralized
estate property to choose between the exclusive options of
redemption and reaffirmation. This ensures the debtor's fresh
financial start, yet prevents the debtor from receiving a head start
at the expense of secured creditors. Such an interpretation advances
the purpose of the amendments to balance the equities between
debtors and creditors.
Debra S. Friedman
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